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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #07089-84/1
20 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Frederick L. Wettersing
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 18 December 1984. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

Frederick L. Wettersing
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Attachment:
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WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

UGANDA

President Obote is plagued by a deteriorating security situation and continuing political infighting in his government. While there is general agreement that the guerrillas are not a threat to topple the government at present, Obote's army is equally unlikely to decisively defeat the guerrillas. Obote's limited control over the military and refusal to acknowledge that he has a human rights "problem" complicates the situation and adds to the uncertainty.

We now estimate that there are about 330 North Koreans in Uganda. Whether they are taking active part in combat situations or merely serving as advisers is unclear, however.

WARNING NOTE: The publication of the upcoming Human Rights Report almost certainly will further sour US/Ugandan relations. An angered Obote--given that most of his closest confidants are so advising--could use the report as a pretext to turn more to the East, most likely North Korea and possibly Cuba.

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NIGERIA

The political and economic climate in Nigeria continues to deteriorate as the Buhari government approaches the anniversary of its first year in office. Reports that Buhari is on his way out--voluntarily or by way of a coup--are rampant. At present, General Ibrahim Babangida appears to be the senior officer best situated to replace Buhari. There appears to be a noticeable increase in jockeying for position among northern political and military heavyweights that well could serve as a precursor to a shuffle among northern leadership. At the same time, the now almost constant reports of grumbling among junior and middle grade officers continue.

WARNING NOTE: The community is in agreement that a change at the top could come within the next month. Note is made that the Buhari government is scheduled to make its budget statement late this month, that 31 December marks the anniversary of the Buhari coup, and that 15 January marks the anniversary of the "majors' coup" in 1966. Discontented officers--of all ranks--do not want for pretexts ranging from preempting others to personal ambition to continuing economic decline.

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UPDATES

ANGOLA: Savimbi is promising to have thousands of troops ready by late December to take the war to the Northwest and Luanda and to establish permanent bases in Zaire, Uige, and northern Malanje provinces. The near-term outlook is for more fighting at greater intensity.

It was noted that Angola, somewhat belatedly, appears to be developing units for counter-insurgency operations, and that the government is stockpiling materiel.

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Cuito Cuanavale is being prepared for jet operations and that the government may be planning a military response--including greater use of airpower--when the weather improves.

Although impossible to make a definitive statement at present, the community will be paying close heed during the coming year for signs that Cuba is reassessing its role/presence/exposure.

CHAD: Habre is in a difficult position with little prospect of near-term improvement. The current situation in Chad is best characterized as static.

Libya continues to recruit in the north while attempting--without much concrete success--to unify the various factions. Particular note was made of the potential implications of Mitterrand's statement that implied that Habre wasn't really in control of the south. Meanwhile, there is a lull in the fighting in the south that some Habre supporters believe may be a prelude to a new offensive.

SUDAN: The CIA analysts noted an upsurge in SPLA activities in the south, but felt it was too early to refer to it as a new offensive. Note was made, however, of the political overtones to recent attacks--kidnapings for example--and the failure thus far of the government to make a unified, coordinated response.

The political, economic, financial, and social challenges facing Nimeiri have been detailed in previous warning reports. Given the universally dismal outlook, there was considerable discussion at this meeting of whether or not Nimeiri could well be preparing to make one of his patented grand gestures or flip-flops. In particular, we will be alert in coming months for any signs that Nimeiri may be contemplating a "reconciliation" with Libya or Ethiopia.

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